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The Role of Vendor Legitimacy in IT Outsourcing Performance: 
Theory and Evidence 
 
Abstract  
Information technology (IT) outsourcing relationships today are facing increasingly turbulent environments. With 
rapid changes in technological, commercial, societal, and regulatory landscapes, client firms have to closely and 
continually assess the desirability and appropriateness, or legitimacy, of their vendors in such dynamic settings. In 
this research, the focus is on client firms’ perceived legitimacy of vendors, termed “vendor legitimacy.” Specifically, 
building on institutional theory, vendor legitimacy is conceptualized as consisting of three dimensions − pragmatic, 
moral, and cognitive − and is examined through their respective impact on IT outsourcing performance. The role 
of key governance strategies for managing vendor legitimacy, namely contractual governance and relational 
governance, are likewise explored. Results from a multiple-sourced, matched pair, cross-industry sample of 
executives and managers of 185 client firms reveal that these various governance strategies exert differential 
impacts on the aforementioned dimensions of vendor legitimacy, which, in turn, drive performance.  
Keywords: IT outsourcing; contractual governance; relational governance; vendor legitimacy  
 
1. Introduction 
Outsourcing information technology (IT) functions to professional vendors has been commonly adopted by 
organizations worldwide to reduce capital expenditures, save recurring costs, increase operational flexibility, and 
acquire strategic innovations (Lacity et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2004). In today’s increasingly uncertain and volatile 
business environments, however, outsourcing is fraught with problems (Deloitte 2018). Client firms have to closely 
and continually assess the desirability and appropriateness of their vendors in that digital technologies, industry 
landscapes, regulatory frameworks, and social environments are rapidly evolving (KPMG 2017). In such ever-
changing settings, previously high-performing vendors may no longer be deemed legitimate (Barrett et al. 2008) 
by the client. A perceived loss of legitimacy may thus subsequently influence outsourcing outcomes. 
Deconstructing the role of such client perceptions about vendor legitimacy is theoretically interesting in that such 
knowledge can deepen our understanding of the dynamics between clients and vendors in what is now a turbulent 
environment. Such knowledge is also managerially important since empirical findings can provide insights into how 
client organizations can effectively govern and navigate contemporary IT outsourcing (ITO) projects. 
The notion of legitimacy in ITO relationships has become increasingly salient for several reasons. The 
proliferation of disruptive technologies (Kane et al. 2015), the emergence of vendors from diverse global markets 
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(Fogarty and Bell 2014), and changing social and regulatory landscapes (Babin et al. 2011) have all been molding 
client expectations about and evaluations of their vendors. These, in turn, influence the clients’ interaction with 
vendors and follow-on ITO performance. Recent industry surveys on firm experiences with IT outsourcing 
worldwide, for example, reveal that clients face a variety of challenging issues and concerns, including vendors’ 
reactive approach, unqualified resources, insufficient service quality, limited responsiveness, and lack of innovation 
(Deloitte 2016) as well as uncertainties related to security, legal compliance, and intellectual property (Deloitte 
2018). This suggests that in order to successfully navigate ITO landscapes, client organizations should actively 
and continuously monitor and manage vendor desirability, credibility, and appropriateness, namely, their legitimacy.  
Since the turn of the millennium, legitimacy has become a seminal concept in academic research on 
interorganizational relationships, relationships such as strategic alliances and firm networks (Dacin et al. 2007; 
Human and Provan 2000). Defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman 1995, p. 574), legitimacy is a form of intangible, highly significant organizational resource (Bitektine 
2011), one that assures that “organization[al] practices, values or contributions are aligned with stakeholders’ 
interests” (Landau et al. 2014, p. 1324). Moreover, it directly affects organizational performance (Dacin et al. 2007).  
The information systems (IS) literature has explored the notion of legitimacy with a focus on ITO’s “external 
legitimacy in its host environment” (Kostova and Zaheer 1999, p. 67), that is, the acceptance of a firm by the 
broader societal environment. Specifically, prior studies have examined how external pressures from 
organizational institutional environments affect the adoption of ITO as a new operating model (Ang and Straub 
1998; Angst et al. 2017; Miranda and Kim 2006). Complementing the existing IS and management literatures, the 
present research focuses on legitimacy internal (Drori and Honig 2013) to ITO relationships, that is, “the 
acceptance of an organization by its internal constituencies” (Kumar and Das 2007, p. 1427). Specifically, the first 
extended goal of this research is to unpack client perceptions of the legitimacy of vendors and to then examine the 
ITO performance impacts of such perceptions.  
Vendor legitimacy can be shaped by the strategic actions taken by parties involved in an ITO project. Both 
academic and practitioner literatures have documented a host of strategic actions for managing ITO (Himmelreich 
et al. 2019; Srivastava and Teo 2012). These are commonly categorized into two types. Contractual governance 
focuses on the use of formal, specific, and explicit contracts to regulate the interactions between clients and 
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vendors. Relational governance relies on partnering arrangements such as information sharing and cooperation 
as mechanisms to enforce obligations and expectations in interorganizational exchanges (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo 
and Zenger 2002).  
Governance strategies can influence legitimacy in ITO in multiple ways. Externally, contractual and relational 
governance can be adopted as strategic responses to institutional pressures from markets at large (Yang et al. 
2012). Internally, evidence suggests that effective governance strategies can increase the legitimacy of ITO in 
general and the legitimacy of individual vendors in particular (Su et al. 2016). Building on this work, our second 
main aim, thus, is to further examine how governance strategies influence vendor legitimacy in ITO projects. 
Two key research questions emerge: (RQ1) To what extent does an ITO vendor’s legitimacy, as perceived 
by its client, affect outsourcing performance?; and (RQ2) To what extent do outsourcing governance strategies 
affect vendor legitimacy? To address these two research questions regarding the relationship between vendor 
legitimacy, performance, and governance, vendor legitimacy is conceptualized via its three subconstructs. 
Following this is a modeling of their respective impact on outsourcing performance. Next the links between 
governance strategies and the three types of vendor legitimacy are posited. Finally, our theoretical model is then 
tested using multiple-sourced, matched pair, cross-industry sample of managers from 185 ITO clients.  
Findings contribute to the IS literature in several ways. First, the study identifies and incorporates a novel 
perspective of vendor ITO legitimacy, an increasingly important yet understudied theoretical lens. It develops a 
nuanced conceptualization of three types of legitimacy internal to the client-vendor relationship. Importantly, the 
theoretical model complements and enriches currently dominant theoretical underpinnings of the ITO literature. 
Second, the study advances our understanding of the key ITO success factors by empirically examining the 
differential performance implications of the three types of vendor legitimacy. Results suggest that the cognitive 
legitimacy of the vendor, which centers on the client’s perception of the vendor as a taken-for-granted and integral 
part of the interfirm relationship, has a particularly high impact on ITO performance. Third, the study offers fine-
grained insights into the pivotal role of governance strategies by showing how different types of vendor legitimacy 
can be influenced by the deployment of contractual governance and relational governance in ITO arrangements. 
2. IT Outsourcing Relationship  
IT outsourcing, a movement that has shaped the global business landscape, has been extensively studied. Several 
dominant theoretical perspectives have been adopted to conceptualize, model, and illuminate the relationships 
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between clients and vendors.1 These complementary theoretical perspectives (e.g., Lee et al. 2019; Tiwana and 
Bush 2007) collectively provide the foundation for understanding the multi-faceted decisions and actions in ITO.  
Much of the ITO literature has been grounded in economic theories. Transaction costs economics (TCE), in 
particular, has served as an important theoretical lens (Ang and Straub 1998). Focusing initially on the broader 
context of vertical integration (Williamson 1985), transaction costs represent a key factor influencing firms’ 
outsourcing decisions and performance (Aral et al. 2018; Aubert et al. 1996). In addition to TCE, agency theory 
has also been adopted to theorize risks in ITO and the associated risk mitigation mechanisms (Bahli and Rivard 
2003; Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Gefen et al. 2008).  
The strategic perspective on ITO develops the concept of resource, from the resource-based view (RBV) of 
the firm (Barney and Clifford 2010; Peteraf 1993), as the foundational logic for ITO decisions (King and Torkzadeh 
2008; Roy and Aubert 2002). Consonant with RBV, ITO decisions are driven by the client turning vendor-offered 
resources, such as human resources (Levina and Ross 2003), talent and expertise (Kotlarsky et al. 2014), 
organizational structures (Du and Pan 2013), social capital (Rottman 2008), intellectual property (Walden 2005) 
and innovation (Sartor and Beamish 2014), into competitive advantage (Jarvenpaa and Mao 2008).  
The social perspective emphasizes the role of social interactions in shaping ITO relationships. Prior research 
has identified a rich set of social mechanisms, including bonding, communication, mutual dependency, and power 
dynamics between and within ITO parties (Kern and Willcocks 2000; Lee and Kim 1999), which contribute to the 
development and maintenance of client-vendor relationships. Organizational capabilities in effectively managing 
such ever-changing social processes (Handley and Angst 2015; Kaiser and Hawk 2004) can directly impact the 
quality of the interfirm relationship and ITO performance (Abbott et al. 2013; Swar et al. 2012).  
The psychological perspective focuses on the role of individual-level psychological factors and processes. 
Psychological contracts, that is, “an individual's beliefs regarding the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange 
agreement between that focal person and another party” (Rousseau 1989, p. 123), in particular, have proven to 
be an especially important concept in ITO. Psychological contracts strengthen the explicit legal contractual 
agreements by incorporating the mutual obligations internalized by the stakeholders in both the client and the 
vendor (Kim et al. 2007; Koh et al. 2004). Such obligations have significant effects on both the governance and 
 
1 See Online Supplement Appendix A for the discussion on the conceptual distinction between trust and legitimacy in interorganizational 
relationships and Online Supplement Appendix B for the table of summary on theoretical perspectives on ITO relationships 
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performance of ITO (Kim et al. 2013; Lioliou et al. 2014; Miranda and Kavan 2005), as well other innovative forms 
of outsourcing, such as global open sourcing (Ågerfalk and Fitzgerald 2008). 
The novel theoretical perspective in our study that brings the legitimacy construct to the fore is increasingly 
relevant in today’s ITO arena. In an existing ITO relationship, rapid changes in technologies, market environments, 
and regulatory and social landscapes (Kane et al. 2015) can all radically alter clients’ perceptions about to what 
extent vendors are appropriate and desirable, that is to say, legitimate (Suchman 1995). The critical role of “internal 
legitimacy” (Martinez and Dacin 1999, pp. 81- 82, italicizing added for emphasis) − perceived by clients as one of 
their driving forces in organizational decision-making and action − has been well documented and highlighted in 
the management literature (Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Lu and Xu 2006). Legitimacy, for example, can contribute 
to new venture performance in that legitimacy, despite deep environmental uncertainty, helps motivate investors 
by “signaling that the organization is properly constituted; committed to the proper scripts, rules, norms, values, 
and models; able to use appropriate means; and pursuing acceptable ends” (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002, p. 416). 
Notably, the IS literature has taken a first step to identify and decompose the concept of legitimacy in client-
vendor relationships. For example, exploratory, qualitative research has uncovered strategies and activities 
employed by a client to legitimize offshore ITO, demonstrating why legitimacy should be managed strategically 
and how such legitimacy could lead to successful ITO projects (Barrett et al. 2008). But further examination of 
legitimacy is needed. Today’s ITO landscape requires decision-makers to assess whether and how different 
vendors are legitimate. Initially, perceived vendor legitimacy can be shaped by client governance strategies. This 
perception can then strengthen the interactions and deepen the relationship between the client and the vendor, 
which in turn, should influence performance. A more in-depth understanding of the causal linkages among 
legitimacy, governance, and outsourcing performance can be especially relevant for both IS theories and 
managerial practices of ITO in an increasingly uncertain global environment.  
3. Vendor Legitimacy in IT Outsourcing  
Drawing on institutional perspectives and theories, we adapt Suchman’s conceptualization of legitimacy (1995) to 
define vendor legitimacy in ITO. It is the client’s perception that the vendor’s actions are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate with respect to the norms, values, and beliefs of the client organization. Based on Suchman (1995), 
vendor legitimacy consists of three broad types, termed vendor pragmatic legitimacy, vendor moral legitimacy, and 
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vendor cognitive legitimacy. Specifically, pragmatic legitimacy derives from self-interested calculations regarding 
practical consequences of actions; moral legitimacy reflects the evaluation regarding rightness and fairness in the 
broader value systems; and cognitive legitimacy emphasizes taken-for-grantedness of the involved organization 
(Kumar and Das 2007). Prior studies have demonstrated the importance of pragmatic, moral, and cognitive 
legitimacy in influencing the viability or performance of organizations in areas such as strategic alliances (Kumar 
and Das 2007), internationalization (Yang et al. 2012), and cross-cultural interorganizational information systems 
adoption (Hsu et al. 2015). In the same vein, this taxonomy of legitimacy potentially allows for a more nuanced, 
substantive and in-depth elaboration of the impacts of legitimacy on ITO relationships. 
Vendor pragmatic legitimacy refers to the client’s perception of the vendor’s actions as furthering the client’s 
own interests. This type of legitimacy is based on the client’s assessment and judgement of the vendor’s adherence 
to desirable behavior and expected practices, typically specified in the agreement between the two organizations. 
Being committed and responsive to the client’s requirements and expectations can be seen as contributing to the 
attainment of pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman 1995). For example, Barrett et al. (2008) found that offshore IT 
vendors could gain legitimacy when demonstrating skills and capabilities for completing the specific tasks defined 
in the contract and in supporting the overall business strategy of the client. Their findings align well with Kumar 
and Das’ description (2007) of pragmatic legitimacy mitigating uncertainties regarding whether a partner can 
consistently and effectively achieve the stated goals of a strategic alliance.  
Vendor moral legitimacy reflects the client’s perception of the vendor’s rightness and fairness (Kumar and 
Das 2007) within the client organization’s “system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 
579). This type of legitimacy is related to the evaluation of the vendor’s conformance to ITO justice norms. During 
interorganizational interaction, if the vendor is perceived as not meeting the client’s expected moral and ethical 
standards, this type of legitimacy can be weakened. For example, Aron et al. (2005) and Handley and Benton 
(2012) explored the risks in outsourcing associated with unethical vendor actions of poaching or misuse of sensitive 
information, two actions that signal the erosion of vendor moral legitimacy. Li and Zhou (2017) also suggest that 
questions regarding firms’ moral legitimacy can emerge when environmental and social problems arise in ITO. 
Vendor cognitive legitimacy relies on “widely held beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions that prove a 
framework for everyday routines” (Scott 1995, p. 81). Vendor cognitive legitimacy implies that the client firm accepts 
the interaction with the vendor as a natural and inevitable reality (Kumar and Das 2007). This acceptance is reified 
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by the client not even considering any other vendor as a viable alternative for their ITO project, for instance. 
According to Suchman (1995, p. 583), “this kind of taken-for-grantedness represents both the subtlest and the 
most powerful source of legitimacy.” Vendor cognitive legitimacy can contribute to the formation of 
interorganizational identity (Peteraf and Shanley 1997) while reducing the mental effort associated with evaluation 
of the vendor and avoiding “at least some of the [client] scrutiny of its activities” (Bitektine 2011, p. 157). One good 
example of this in ITO would be how, during the evolution of interorganizational collaboration, the vendor can 
gradually establish its perceived legitimacy while the client might reduce its scrutinizing and questioning of the 
vendor’s practices and relax the micromanagement of the vendor’s actions (Su 2015). 
Institutional theorists (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995) have consistently stressed the performance 
implications of the acquisition and maintenance of legitimacy. In an interorganizational context, Dacin et al. (2007) 
suggest that “legitimation is an important means by which technical benefits can be realized and firm and alliance 
performance can be enhanced. Thus, firms are driven to acquire and maintain legitimacy” (p. 171). Human and 
Provan (2000) likewise demonstrate empirically that legitimacy is a key success factor in interorganizational 
networks. In a highly dynamic environment, legitimacy becomes especially critical to successful adaptation by 
organizations. An example of this is when Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) state that “when faced with uncertain 
decisions (as so many decisions are), social actors refer back to this stock of scripts, rules, norms, values, and 
models in order to proceed” (p. 416). This stance highlights the role of legitimacy rather than “means-ends 
rationality” (p. 416) as a basis for organizational decision-making. In ITO projects in particular, as the technological, 
business, and social environment becomes increasingly volatile, vendor past performance can become a less 
reliable and relevant driver of decision-making (Su et al. 2016). Instead, legitimacy can function as an important, 
intangible “organizational resource…” (Bitektine 2011, p. 151) that shapes the client’s decision-making and actions, 
which subsequently influences ITO performance. 
Given the importance of legitimacy to firm survival and success, extant research on legitimacy has shown 
that organizations engage in strategic actions that can enhance legitimacy and thereby contribute to the pursuit of 
performance or the achievement of goals. Focusing on different settings, such strategic actions include establishing 
strategic alliances to acquire legitimacy through partnering, an alliance that yields economic and competitive 
benefits for the partners (Dacin et al. 2007). Such benefits include working with established institutions to create 
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cognitive legitimacy for an emerging industry (Aldrich and Fiol 1994) and designing and leveraging rhetorical 
strategies to legitimize major institutional changes (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005).  
Documented in the literature, these strategic actions, however, tend to focus on the focal firm’s management 
of external legitimacy, that is, legitimacy in relation to its broader surrounding environment. Much less is known 
about the management and related dynamics of legitimacy within interorganizational relationships (Balogun et al. 
2019; Kumar and Das, 2007), especially ITO relationships. 
To this end, we suggest that vendor legitimacy, an element internal to ITO relationships, is a complex, 
previously lightly-explored but critical element, an element that can be shaped and managed by strategic actions 
of the involved parties during the course of ongoing interorganizational interactions. As Srivastava and Teo (2012) 
put it: “[T]hrough the exercise of control that clients can motivate vendors to deliver applications that meet the 
clients’ specific requirements and are of value to them” (p. 116).  
Indeed, both the academic and practitioner literatures have identified an extensive portfolio of strategic 
actions for governing ITO. Key actions can be broadly categorized into either contractual or relational governance 
(Goo et al. 2009; Huber et al. 2013; Oshri et al. 2015). Such governance strategies may also directly contribute to 
the management of legitimacy in interorganizational settings. For instance, Yang et al. (2012) suggest the use of 
customized contracts to “legitimize…[a] company’s behavior” (p. 44) in cross-border channel relationships. Human 
and Provan (2000) find that developing strong bonds and information exchanges among member firms can 
contribute to the legitimacy of multilateral networks of such firms. In ITO, both contractual and relational 
governance strategies have the potential to shape vendor legitimacy and impact ITO performance, especially in 
turbulent business environments (Su et al. 2016).  
However, what is clear is that no prior research has formally theorized and empirically examined the impacts 
of these two established governance strategies on vendor legitimacy. Building on extant theoretical perspectives 
and empirical findings, we posit that governance strategies deployed to manage client-vendor relationships could 
also influence vendor legitimacy, thereby also impacting ITO performance. By focusing on vendor legitimacy as a 
key perspective for examining dynamics in client-vendor interactions, this study seeks to further unpack how 
governance strategies shape ITO relationships.  
4. Model and Hypothesis Development  
Linking the dots together, Figure 1 foreshadows the research model proposed in this study.  
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model Depicting the Role of Vendor Legitimacy in IT Outsourcing 
 
4.1.  Governance Strategies and Vendor Legitimacy 
4.1.1. Contractual Governance and Vendor Legitimacy 
Contractual governance emphasizes the design and implementation of specific, detailed, and explicit contracts 
that “represent promises or obligations to perform certain actions in the future” (Poppo and Zenger 2002, p. 708). 
Overall, contractual governance creates a “logic of appropriateness” (March 1994, p. iii) between the partnering 
firms. In ITO, contracts between clients and vendors typically encompass several broad areas, including expected 
services, monitoring provisions; dispute resolution; property rights allocation and protection, contingency, and 
incentives (Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Liu and Aron 2015). A logical extension of this is that client adoption of 
contractual governance can have a positive impact on client perceptions of the three types of vendor legitimacy.   
Vendor pragmatic legitimacy deals with the perception that a vendor’s actions can further a client’s own 
interests. Contractual governance shapes vendor pragmatic legitimacy through two mechanisms. First, by detailing 
the client’s expectations and evaluation schemes, well-specified contracts can ensure that vendor actions and 
input in ITO are aligned with client interests. In ITO, contractual clauses typically include client expectations 
regarding “service-level target, time frame definition, quality statements, etc.” and measurement charters regarding 
“what is to be measured” and the “process to periodically measure the defined categories” (Goo et al. 2009, p. 
131). When measuring the direct vendor input is not intuitively obvious, contractual clauses can specify procedures 
for monitoring the vendor through “disclosure of necessary documents to justify work done” (Poppo and Zenger 
2002, p. 709). Through such clauses, contracts can accordingly better regulate and control vendor productivity 
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(Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Srivastava and Teo 2012). Contractual clauses, hence, contribute to aligning 
the vendor’s interests with the client, an alignment that increases vendor pragmatic legitimacy.  
Second, contractual governance contributes to the avoidance of interfirm conflict and facilitates the resolution 
of interfirm disputes. In interfirm relationships, contractual governance delineates explicit, clear, agreed-upon 
provisions regarding the roles, responsibilities, prohibitions, and legal sanctions for the partnering firms. ITO 
contracts also specify detailed conflict arbitration procedures, exit policies, and penalties for violating the contract, 
for both the client and the vendor. Strong contractual governance can thus reduce interfirm conflicts by guarding 
against vendor opportunistic behavior (Oliveira and Luminea 2019) against underinvestment in the interfirm 
relationship (Williamson 1985) and against “misrepresentation,” “bluffing,” and “outright falsification” (Kumar and 
Das 2007, p. 1439). When conflict arises, contractual governance also “allows the parties to better understand 
each other’s interests and to establish working rules and habits for how to amicably resolve points of contention” 
(Lumineau and Malhotra 2011, p. 548). Contracts serve as a safeguard against opportunism and a framework for 
conflict resolution (Reuer and Ariño 2007; Malhotra and Murnighan 2002) and increase the client’s confidence that 
the vendor will exhibit expected behaviors, an effect that further enhances vendor pragmatic legitimacy. Based on 
the rationale above, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Contractual governance is positively related to vendor pragmatic legitimacy in ITO. 
 
Vendor moral legitimacy relies on the client’s perception of vendor rightness and fairness. In ITO, the concept 
of moral legitimacy has been particularly salient in two domains. The first area concerns the ownership and 
appropriation of ITO assets and IP, that is, intellectual property (Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Walden 2005). Vendor 
moral legitimacy is challenged when inappropriate moral practices arise from disputed use of the IP and distribution 
or reverse engineering of software source code or other products. ITO contracts increasingly emphasize the 
institutionalization of standards, certifications, policies, procedures, and regulations on IP-related issues (Agrawal 
and Lee 2019; Bartley 2007). For instance, service level agreements (SLAs) in ITO contracts provide clear 
definition of confidential and secret information, which can help prevent data-related misconduct by the vendor 
(Benaroch et al. 2016). As a result, contractual governance directly contributes to the client’s perception of the 
“rightness” of the vendor, an assessment that leads directly to a heightened perception of moral legitimacy. 
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The second aspect of vendor moral legitimacy is related more broadly to judgements about vendor ethical 
standards and moral practices such as their corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSER). In sourcing 
in general (Agrawal and Lee 2019; Orsdemir et al. 2019) and ITO in particular (Babin et al. 2011; Babin and 
Nicholson 2009), contractual governance increasingly requires policies and provisions that mandate that vendors 
show responsibility and concerns for a diverse set of stakeholders beyond their clients. Such contractual clauses 
can foster a vendor’s positive relationship with other, different stakeholders, including “employees, local 
communities, society-at-large, [and] the natural environment” (Flammer 2018, p. 1302). Vendor adoption of and 
engagement in CSER-related standards and practices signals (Harjoto and Jo 2011) that the vendor is positioning 
itself as a good citizen (Flammer 2018). As Suchman (1995) highlighted, moral legitimacy reflects “a prosocial 
logic” (p. 579) of rightness and the sense of citizenship. Thus, through the exercise of contract controls, vendors 
are likely to behave in a morally acceptable manner, thereby contributing to the client perception (Panagopoulos 
et al. 2016) that its collaboration with the vendor fits with its own beliefs and values, i.e., being “the right thing to 
do” (Kumar and Das 2007, p. 1434). Based on the rationale above, we posit that: 
H2: Contractual governance is positively related to vendor moral legitimacy in ITO. 
 
Vendor cognitive legitimacy is associated with interorganizational dynamics based on cognition rather than 
calculation of interest or evaluation (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). In ITO, cognitive legitimacy manifests itself in the client 
taking the involvement of the vendor for granted (with positive, not negative connotations). This takes place through 
the formation of deep cognitive bonds and routines (Scott 1995) between the two organizations. Contractual 
governance shapes vendor cognitive legitimacy through two mechanisms. First, contractual governance enhances 
mutual understanding between client and vendor (Lumineau and Malhotra 2011). In an interfirm relationship, “the 
difference in latent knowledge” (Kumar and Das 2007, p. 1431) of the partnering firms represents a barrier in 
establishing cognitive legitimacy and subsequent coordination (Hargadon and Fanelli 2002). In contractual 
governance, the process of designing, negotiating, implementing, and renewing contracts (Faems et al. 2008) 
serves as a learning experience for both partners (Li et al. 2010; Ryall and Sampson 2009). Through this 
experience, the client acquires in-depth knowledge of the vendor’s strategic interests and organizational practices 
(Lumineau and Malhotra 2011; Im and Rai 2008). Such knowledge is conducive to the client accepting the vendor’s 
reality (Kumar and Das 2001), which, in turn, increases cognitive legitimacy.  
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Second, contractual governance facilitates the emergence of interorganizational routines, or “stable patterns 
of interaction [between the] two firms” (Zollo et al. 2002, p. 701). The SLAs specify detailed interorganizational 
processes such as plans for communication, innovation, and feedback (Goo et al. 2009). With these plans in place, 
the behavior of the two organizations tends to become routinized (Cohen and Bacdayan 1994; Nelson and Winter 
1982) in a semiautomatic rather than deliberate or conscious manner (Zollo et al. 2002). In such relationships, the 
vendor will be viewed as a natural extension of the client’s own organization, signaling a high level of vendor 
cognitive legitimacy. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:  
H3: Contractual governance is positively related to vendor cognitive legitimacy in ITO. 
 
4.1.2. Relational Governance and Vendor Legitimacy 
Relational governance emphasizes social processes that promote information exchange, open communication, 
solidarity, and collaboration between the parties (Poppo and Zenger 2002). Vendor pragmatic legitimacy can be 
strengthened by relational governance in two ways. First, active information exchange between client and service 
provider can align the interests of the exchange partners (Aral et al. 2018; Poppo et al. 2008). This mutually-
beneficial client-vendor interaction is, in fact, sometimes termed a “pragmatic collaboration…” (Helper et al. 2000, 
p. 443). From the client’s perspective, there is a heightened expectation that the vendor will engage in activities 
that advance the interest of the client, an eventuality that then contributes to client-perceived pragmatic legitimacy. 
Second, relational governance involves “an organization’s engagement in activities for the development of 
informal self-enforcing safeguards” (Sarkar et al. 2009, p. 587). Taking the form of the sharing of private information, 
commitment to joint action, and norms of flexibility, such safeguards can further attenuate exchange hazard, 
examples being transaction-specific investments, questionable performance measurements, and other 
uncertainties2 that cannot be sufficiently addressed contractually (Poppo and Zenger 2002). In particular, the 
informal control mechanisms commonly embedded in ITO relational governance (Gopal and Gosain 2010) foster 
an environment that “encourages the firms to openly discuss and mutually agree upon any procedural adaptions 
and refinements” (Tiwana 2010, p. 98). Such an environment not only reduces conflict and incompatibility between 
the client and the vendor (Lee and Kim 1999), but also promotes harmonious conflict resolution by enabling the 
 
2 This is often termed “incomplete contracting” in the ITO literature. 
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organizational parties to collaboratively identify and reconcile incompatible viewpoints (Goo et al. 2009; Janssen 
et al. 1999). This combination of safeguards reinforces the client perception that the vendor’s expected behavior 
can further the client’s own interest, another way in which vendor pragmatic legitimacy is enhanced. Based on the 
rationale above, the hypothesis is that:  
H4: Relational governance is positively related to vendor pragmatic legitimacy in ITO. 
 
Sustained socialization taking place between clients and vendors through relational governance mechanisms 
contributes to the emergence of “values shared among exchange partners concerning appropriate behavior that 
maintains or improves their relationship” (Tangpong et al. 2010, p. 398). Congruence of values is foundational to 
the perception of legitimacy (Lagenspetz 1992). Shared values and norms encompass both ethical and moral 
considerations (Joyner and Payne 2002; Oliveira and Luminea 2019) as well as philosophies and practices related 
to corporate social and environmental responsibility (Jin and Drozdenko 2010). The development of shared values 
and norms therefore contributes to the vendor moral legitimacy perceived by the client.  
Besides this, relational governance enables the client to acquire a more nuanced, contextualized, and in-
depth understanding of vendor actions and decisions related to business ethics and social and environmental 
responsibilities. Research has shown that standards and judgements related to business ethics can vary with the 
social context, a context that includes diverse institutional, cultural, and national environments (Tsui and Windsor 
2001). These can even vary significantly within the same country (Martinson and Ma 2009). In relational 
governance, the ongoing social bonding between client and vendor enhances information exchange through 
informal interaction, which allows the two parties to “open a dialog on their needs, experiences and even trade 
secrets” (Lee and Choi 2011, p. 98). This increased level of transparency (Sarkar et al. 1998) combined with a 
“sincere attempt to understand the other party’s perspective” (Kumar and Das 2007, p. 1431), can provide the 
client with a more informed and well-rounded judgement about the appropriateness vendor actions and decisions. 
When this works, it leads to enhanced perceived vendor moral legitimacy. Based on this, we hypothesize that:  
H5: Relational governance is positively related to vendor moral legitimacy in ITO. 
 
Through repeated social interactions where cognition and knowledge are deeply embedded (Scott 2008), 
“social-psychological bonds” (Ring and Van de Ven 1994, p. 93) between the exchange partners are developed 
and strengthened. Specifically, socialization between the client and the vendor facilitates the formation of a joint 
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identity and a higher order of meaning in interorganizational collaboration (Kumar and Andersen 2000). For 
example, in offshore outsourcing, joint training and opportunities for socializing between the client’s onshore, 
internal IT staff and the offshore vendor’s staff can blur the line between “them” and “us” (Rottman 2008). Through 
informal interactions, a deepening interpersonal relationship between parties spans organizational boundaries and 
transforms outsiders into insiders; it also enhances the solidarity between the two firms (Su and Littlefield 2001). 
Overall, relational bonds formed through social interaction mitigate cognitive distance (Yang et al. 2012) and 
improve cognitive congruence (Heide 1994), contributing thereafter to cognitive vendor legitimacy. 
Second, vendor cognitive legitimacy is further strengthened by the establishment of interorganizational 
routines between client and vendor. Open and active sharing of business information and practices adds to both 
partners’ knowledge and experience, functioning as a foundation for new interorganizational routines. As 
interorganizational routines become embedded in the exchange relationship, partners increasingly take each other 
for granted, again, in a positive sense (Gulati 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Zollo et al. 2002). Through the 
process of routinization, the “persistent cognitive component” of routines (Hodgson and Knudsen 2010, p. 13) 
strengthens this “taken-for-grantedness,” leading to more vendor cognitive legitimacy. Based on the rationale 
above, we hypothesize that:   
H6: Relational governance is positively related to vendor cognitive legitimacy in ITO. 
 
4.2. Vendor Legitimacy and Outsourcing Performance 
Existing research has demonstrated the value of legitimacy and the performance implications of legitimacy in 
sundry settings (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Dacin et al. 2007; Rao et al. 2008). In light of ITO complexities and 
uncertainties, attaining and sustaining these three types of vendor legitimacy helps to align vendor actions with 
client interests, to view vendor actions through moral and ethical standards, and to accept the vendor as a natural, 
taken-for-granted partner. Collectively, these effects lead to improved outsourcing performance, as articulated in 
the set of hypotheses in this section. 
 First, vendor pragmatic legitimacy can contribute to ITO performance. High levels of vendor pragmatic 
legitimacy mean that vendor actions are aligned well with client interests. Well aligned in this way, the vendor 
makes a “self-interested calculation…” (Suchman 1995, p. 578) to further its own interest at the same time as the 
interest of its client (Kumar and Das 2007). This comes directly from both parties being confident that their 
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partnership can achieve their mutual goals in an effective way. In support of this point, Lee and Kim (1999) show 
that the psychological belief of mutual benefit has a direct and positive impact on outsourcing success. Furthermore, 
with aligned interests, the vendor tends to capitalize on the outsourcing relationship as an opportunity to build 
capabilities (Levina and Ross 2003), is more willing to take up managerial responsibilities (Lee and Kim 1999), and 
delivers overall high performance in ITO projects (Lacity and Willcocks 2013).  
Second, the sense of transactional interest alignment between parties reduces the likelihood of opportunistic 
behaviors (Yang et al. 2012), which further lowers transactional safeguarding costs. Thus, instead of investing 
energy and resources in monitoring and relationship management, a strong belief in vendor pragmatic legitimacy 
allows both parties to redirecting time and resources into exploiting and creating value for sustained growth and 
long-term ITO success. Based on the above rationale, we hypothesize that: 
H7: Vendor pragmatic legitimacy is positively related to ITO performance. 
 
Vendor moral legitimacy also increases ITO performance. First, when the vendor’s values and practices are 
perceived to be ethical and moral from the perspective of the client organization, the vendor is more likely to follow 
the agreed-upon codes of conduct and maintain expected standards even in the face of complex social, legal, 
environmental, and political issues. In the area of IP, a key area of concern in ITO in particular, the vendor with a 
high level of moral legitimacy is less likely to poach or misappropriate sensitive information and violate property 
rights (Handley and Benton 2012), which not only lowers the cost incurred in safeguarding the breaches (Benaroch 
et al. 2016, Chen and Bharadwaj 2009) but also limits “the loss of competitive advantage arising from the wide-
scale distribution of the intellectual property” (Walden 2005, p. 700). Second, Kumar and Anderson (2000) contend 
that moral legitimacy tends to strengthen partnering firms’ psychological commitment to the alliance and maintain 
high level of procedural justice during the interorganizational exchange. In this connection, when a firm is perceived 
to treat its alliance members and other relevant stakeholders with respect and reasonable ethics, actors involved 
are more likely to respond and commit to offering better access to resources, maintaining cooperative attitudes, 
and being willing to provide active support of the organization, all of which lead to favourable alliance outcomes. 
In the ITO literature, several scholars have uncovered the positive impact of commitment on outsourcing 
performance (Grover et al. 1996; Lee 2001). Empirical evidence in a corporate environment also suggests that firm 
- 16 - 
ethical practices such as CSER related engagements can contribute to their financial performance (Margolis and 
Walsh 2003; Margolis et al. 2007). Based on this rationale, we posit that: 
H8: Vendor moral legitimacy is positively related to ITO performance. 
 
Vendor cognitive legitimacy can also improve ITO performance. First, attaining cognitive legitimacy in an 
interorganizational relationship implies that organizations have obtained the knowledge of what makes the interfirm 
arrangement successful (Kumar and Das 2007). In ITO, such knowledge contributes to the client’s acceptance of 
the interaction with the vendor as a natural and inevitable reality (Kumar and Das 2007), without actively 
considering any other vendor as a viable alternative (Su 2013). As the client relaxes their close scrutiny and 
micromanagement of vendor actions, the vendor’s autonomy and flexibility to experiment and innovate can create 
significant value for the client (Levina and Vaast 2005; Lacity and Willcocks 2013), a freeing-up that directly 
contributes to ITO performance. 
Second, compared with the other two forms of legitimacy, cognitive legitimacy represents a subtle yet 
powerful form of legitimacy (Suchman 1995). In uncertain and fast-changing environments, firms are more likely 
to question the nature of partnership and their prior vendor choices. With high vendor cognitive legitimacy, however, 
the taken-for-grantedness of the interorganizational routines reinforced by the client perception of cognitive 
legitimacy can effectively reduce “the evaluator’s costs of information search and the mental effort associated with 
the evaluation of each individual organization” (Bitektine 2011, p. 157). This was evident in Su’s qualitative findings 
in which the vendor describes the relationship with the client as follows: “[O]nce they (the client) recognize you, 
they will not easily choose others.… They will not solicit bids for everything… They think of this as a symbiotic 
relationship” (Su 2013, p. 184). In ITO, such deeply embedded interorganizational routines contribute to a “vertical-
quasi integration” (Kern and Willcocks 2000, p. 339) between the client and the vendor. Evidence suggests that 
this integration of the vendor as a natural extension of the client’s own organization can increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of ITO arrangements, especially in a turbulent business environment (Su et al. 2016). Accordingly:  
H9: Vendor cognitive legitimacy is positively related to ITO performance. 
 
5. Research Methodology 
The method adopted was a field study using a matched-pair instrument for data collection. The unit of analysis is 
an IT outsourcing project and the main nomological constructs and linkages have already been depicted above in 
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Figure 1. Matched-pair data were gathered from 185 client organizations in Korea via a research instrument using 
independent sources, namely, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) vis-à-vis the IT staff interfacing with the client’s 
outsourcing vendors. These self-reports were augmented by relatively objective archival performance data 
garnered from the public source of the Korean Stock Exchange (http://sm.krx.co.kr). Since the sampling frame of 
this study was 1,500 larger Korean companies, the 185 organizations in our sample were all listed on the Korean 
stock market and their financial performance data can be found on the website. The full dataset was analyzed via 
Covariance-Based Structural Equation Modelling (CB-SEM) (Hair et al. 2014).  
5.1. Development of Measures 
We designed, pre-tested, and piloted an instrument consisting of all reflective scales to measure the two 
independent variables (contractual governance and relational governance) and the three mediating variables 
(vendor pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy). In addition, the dependent, latent variable 
of outsourcing performance was measured as a formative second-order, reflective first-order construct consisting 
of two sub-constructs (specifically, value capture focusing on operational efficiency and value creation focusing on 
innovation and generation of new knowledge).3  
Scale development took place over three stages: (1) item generation based on prior literature using the card 
sorting method (Moore and Benbasat 1991) and extensive feedback from 15 academics and practitioners; (2) pre-
testing of scales by five IT outsourcing managers from a set of industry-diverse firms; and (3) a pilot test involving 
45 companies experienced in IT outsourcing practices. During the scale development process, 14 out of 35 items 
that were initially developed were dropped (seven items in a pretest and seven items in a pilot test), which resulted 
in 21 final items. The final questionnaire items appear in Online Supplement Appendix C and the instrument 
validation steps prior to the primary data-gathering and testing are described in much greater detail in Online 
Supplement Appendix D.  
Multiple subsequent phases of instrument development and validation led to further refinement and 
restructuring of the instrument and also established the initial face validity of the measures (Nunnally and Bernstein 
1994; Trochim et al. 2016). These tests provided strong evidence that the instrument was ready for full scale testing.  
 
3 Value creation and value capture can be classified as two major types of Ricardian interorganizational rent (Miranda and Kavan 2005; 
Subramani 2004). Value capture refers to efficiency in resource allocation and process deployment by replicating services and increasing 
current productivity (Moran and Ghoshal 1999). Value creation promotes the idea that organizations can combine and transform existing 
interorganizational resources to generate a new service or to innovate (Bowman and Ambrosini 2000; Miranda and Kavan 2005). 
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To account for extraneous sources of variation in outsourcing benefits and to deal with the inevitable 
endogeneity issues inherent in non-experimental research, nine control variables (i.e., outsourcing project type, 
outsourcing project size, outsourcing project length, prior outsourcing relationship, client industry type, vendor 
established year, vendor reputation, relative firm size, and time span) were incorporated into the model. The 
downstream impacts of outsourcing governance and vendor legitimacy can differ according to the size and length 
of the outsourcing project as measured by the actual amount and project duration stated in the contract (Ang and 
Straub 1998; Rai et al. 2009). We also controlled for outsourcing project type, which referred to the various 
functional categories of IT outsourcing. Six dummy variables were used to represent major outsourcing functions: 
(1) application development and maintenance; (2) network management; (3) IT consulting; (4) data center 
management; (5) help desk activities; and (6) all others (Lacity and Willcocks 1998 and Rai et al. 2009).  
In addition, since the existence of an a priori outsourcing relationship between an organization and its 
outsourcing vendor could conceivably have some influence on the realization of benefits (Lee and Kim 1999; Rai 
et al. 2009), the duration of prior relationships was controlled for to partial out a potentially spurious effect. We also 
controlled for client industry and the year the vendor was established because they could have some influence on 
the realization of outsourcing benefits (Lee and Kim 1999; Rai et al. 2009). In case of client industry, six dummy 
variables were used to specify six major industry sectors: (1) manufacturing; (2): banking and finance; (3) insurance 
and healthcare; (4) utility and energy; (5) retail and wholesale; and (6) all others. In that the reputation of the vendor 
could likewise have some influence on the relationship between vendor legitimacy and outsourcing performance 
(Hancox and Hackney 2000; Taylor 2007), it was included as a control variable (measured by market share) to 
discount this potential effect. Furthermore, relative firm size between a client and its vendor was treated as a control 
variable because it can represent power differentials and could influence perceptions of legitimacy and outsourcing 
performance. Finally, we controlled for the time span between the end time of ITO project and the time the 
instrument was completed in that respondents can have different remembrances about the same project, 
depending on the point in time of their response. 
5.2. Sample and Data Collection 
The main data collection took place from May to August of 2014. We followed the key informant method by applying 
the procedure reported in prior outsourcing literature (Goo et al. 2009; Rai et al. 2012; Tallon et al. 2000) and using 
a multi-phased approach to maximize participation across a wide variety of firms and industries. Since larger 
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organizations are more likely to outsource, the initial sampling frame was the 1,500 larger companies covered by 
Maeil Business Newspaper’s Annual Corporation Report in Korea. The CIO or the top IT manager in each firm was 
then identified from the Book of Listed Firms published by the Korea Stock Exchange. Because of our focus on 
vendor legitimacy from the perspective of service receivers, 215 IT service providers were removed from the 
sample. Before mailing out the instrument, the top IT manager in each of the 1,285 firms in the sample frame was 
contacted so we could explain the research objective and invite them to be respondents, a “best practice” according 
to Sivo et al. (2006). Out of the 1,285 firms, 897 firms indicated that they were willing to participate in the research, 
thus constituting our prospective sample.  
Next, the questionnaire was sent to 897 corporate level top IT managers of the client firms using personalized 
cover letters that once again explained the study and guaranteed the confidentiality of the collected data. In this 
instrument, respondents were asked to select the most important outsourcing project they had had within the last 
5 years and answer questions regarding that specific project and its service provider. In addition, the top IT 
managers were asked to answer questions about ITO governance strategies (contractual and relational 
governance) and outsourcing rent/performance (value capture and value creation) while IT staff who were in 
charge of the focal outsourcing project were asked to answer questions relevant to the three vendor legitimacy 
factors (pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy). In this way, we were able to create source independence 
between IVs, mediators, and the DV, an approach that virtually rules out CMV, that is, common methods variance 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
During the main data collection process, eleven companies contacted us to provide more detailed information 
about our questionnaire. In response to this, a briefing session in each company provided in-depth explanations 
of our major constructs and their measures (i.e., governance types, legitimacy factors, outsourcing performance). 
The briefing session was followed by a Q&A session to ensure accurate understanding of all the measures. This 
presentation of our major constructs assisted respondents in accurately answering our measures. 
To increase the response rate, the Total Design Method proposed by Dillman (1991) and Sivo et al. (2006) 
was used. A follow-up post-card was mailed one week after the original mailing and the same questionnaire was 
mailed again three and six weeks after the original mailing. After the three rounds of solicitation, a total of 273 
responses were received, providing a response rate of 30.4%. This relatively high response rate, we felt, was due 
to the simplicity of the instrument and the personalized solicitation.  
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As a first step, data quality was ensured. Sixteen responses that did not have responses from both the top IT 
managers and the IT staffs were discarded while 23 responses were eliminated due to incomplete data. We then 
excluded 15 responses from the CIOs or the top IT managers who were in the current position fewer than five 
years because they might not have enough knowledge about the selected IT outsourcing project.  
The next step to increase generalizability was to identify relationships between a focal firm and outsourcing 
vendors that were unique to Korea, specialized relationships that could compromise the integrity of the data. In 
Korea, conglomerate groups such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and other chaebols often conclude ITO contracts 
with their affiliated firms (e.g., Samsung SDS, LG-CNS, SK C&C) within the same conglomerate group. The 
potential issue with such strong affiliative relationships is that ITO contracts are often secured mainly due to the 
chaebol connection, thus making the relationship different from a more independent relationship between an IT 
service provider and client firm. This case may be true not only in Korea but also in other countries in that they 
typically focus on generic systems management services rather than creating unique and innovative IT solutions 
tailored to each customer. Thus, to increase generalizability, 24 chaebol responses4 were culled. 
Furthermore, overlapping outsourcing vendors in the sample were examined. Although the unit of analysis in 
this study is an outsourcing project between a client firm and its vendor, bias is possible when a particular vendor 
was involved in several outsourcing projects across clients. Thus, we handled the issue in three different ways. 
First, the dataset was split into two subgroups, one with vendors not overlapping (n=140) and the other with 
vendors overlapping (n=55), and then compared the IV and DV means (specifically, two governance types, three 
legitimacy factors and outsourcing performance) between two groups using t-statistics. The results showed no 
differences, as shown in the E.1 section of Online Supplement Appendix E. Second, the dataset was divided into 
other subgroups, in particular responses from the first mailing (n=112) and those from the second mailing (n=83). 
In each subgroup, the differences between responses with vendors overlapping and those with vendors not 
overlapping, using t-statistics were tested. Results of the T-tests showed no significant differences in the early 
response group and only one significant difference in the late response group, as summarized in the E.2 section 
of Online Supplement Appendix E. Thus, out of an abundance of caution, 10 late responses that were overlapping 
with other vendors were dropped, a process that ended up with only one vendor appearing five times in our sample. 
 
4 This was based on the list of Top 30 chaebols with their affiliated IT firms issued by the CEO Score Daily (www.ceoscoredaily.com). 
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Finally, with a total of 185 responses, a fixed effect model that controls the effect of vendor overlapping (Han and 
Mithas 2013) was constructed and tested using vendor overlapping dummy (Gould 2011). The test resulted in a 
statistically insignificant p-value of 0.221, inferring that there is no effect from overlapping vendors in the dataset. 
In addition, the potential difference between the final sample (n=185) and the complete sample but excluded 
from the final analysis (n=49; 15 responses fewer than five years in the current position + 24 chaebol responses + 
10 late responses that were overlapping with other vendors) was examined using t-statistics. The results showed 
no differences between the two groups, as shown in the E.3 section of Online Supplement Appendix E.  
The realized sample size for testing, N=185, was sufficient for CB-SEM (Gefen et al. 2011). Respondent 
characteristics in terms of industry type, number of employees, total sales revenue, outsourcing project size, project 
types, and length of prior relationship are summarized in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, some respondents did not 
answer a few questions regarding number of employees, total sales revenue, outsourcing project type and 
outsourcing project size. To deal with the missing data, relatively objective data (number of employees and total 
sales revenue) from the public source of the Korean Stock Exchange served as substitutes and the outsourcing 
project-related data (outsourcing project type and project size) were recollected by contacting the client respondent. 
To further deal with CMV and to improve data quality, the prescriptions of Podsakoff et al. (2003) for ensuring 
anonymity as well as separate data sources for the predictor and criterion variables were followed to the letter. To 
ensure independence of sources, top IT managers were asked questions about ITO governance strategies 
(exogenous variables) and outsourcing performance (the ultimate endogenous variable) and IT staff were asked 
about the three vendor legitimacy variables (mediators). This source separation of the IVs from the final DV is one 
of the surest ways to avoid CMV (Podsakoff et al. 2003).  
Furthermore, three distinct analyses were performed to test for the effect of CMV. First, we performed 
Harman’s single factor test, which is, admittedly, a weaker test. If common method variance is a serious problem 
in the collected data, one might expect either a single factor to emerge from a factor analysis or one general factor 
to account for the majority of the covariance among all measures. A factor analysis was carried out on all items. 
Results demonstrated that seven factors (two independent, three mediators, and two dependent) were extracted 
with eigenvalues greater than one and no general factor was apparent in the unrotated factor structure, indicating 
no excessive CMV. Second, a partial correlation approach was used, following Podsakoff and Organ (1986). The 
AMOS model included the highest factor from the principle component factor analysis as a control variable on two 
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dependent variables. This factor produced no changes in variance explained in any of the two dependent variables, 
which hints that there was no serious CMV. Finally, we performed a single-method factor analysis in AMOS with 
indicators that measure theoretical constructs and a common method construct and rerunning the structural model, 
in accordance with Podsakoff et al. (2003). The results did not change. All in all, the results of the three tests plus 
the independence of data for the IVs and DV (discussed above) suggest that CMV is not of great concern.5  
Table 1. Summary of Respondent Profiles  
(a) Industry type 
Industry Type Frequency % 
Manufacturing 51 27.6 
Banking and Finance 27 14.6 
Insurance/Healthcare 37 20.0 
Utility/Energy 18 9.7 
Retail/Wholesale 16 8.6 
Transportation 9 4.9 
Construction 14 7.6 
Information and Comm. 13 7.0 
Total 185 100 
  
(b) Number of total employees 
Range Frequency % 
Less than 100 40 21.6 
101 – 500 49 26.5 
501 – 1,000 33 17.8 
1,001 – 5,000 47 25.5 
5,001 – 10,000 3 1.6 
10,001 and above 2 1.1 
Unanswered 11 5.9 
Total 185 100 
 
(c) Total sales revenue 
Range Frequency % 
Less than $50 mil. 5 2.7 
$50 - $100 mil. 8 4.3 
$100 - $500 mil. 25 13.5 
$500 - $1 bil. 26 14.1 
$1 - $5 bil. 62 33.5 
$5 - $10 bil. 27 14.6 
$10 bil. and above 23 12.4 
Unanswered 9 4.9 
Total 185 100 
 
(d) Outsourcing project type 
Type Frequency % 
Application development 46 24.9 
Application maintenance 31 16.8 
Network management 20 10.8 
IT consulting 13 7.0 
Data center management 30 16.2 
Desktop configuration 19 10.3 
Helpdesk activities 21 11.3 
Others 5 2.7 
Total 185 100 
 
(e) Outsourcing project size 
Range Frequency % 
Less than $10 mil. 10 5.4 
$10 - $50 mil. 8 4.3 
$50 - $100 mil. 18 9.7 
$100 - $500 mil. 57 30.9 
$500 - $1 bil. 49 26.5 
$1 bil. and above 35 18.9 
Unanswered 8 4.3 
Total 185 100 
 
(f) Length of prior relationship 
Range Frequency % 
Less than 6 months 11 5.9 
6 months – 1 year 15 8.1 
1 – 2 years 27 14.6 
2 – 3 years 32 17.3 
3 - 4 years 56 30.3 
4 – 5 years 16 8.7 
5 years and above 28 15.1 
Unanswered 0 0 
Total 185 100 
An analysis of non-respondent bias was conducted by comparing the total sales revenue and the number of 
employees across the sampling frame (Babbie 1990). For this test, 50 companies were selected at random from 
among the non-respondents and their total sales and number of employees were compared with those of all 
 
5 Chin et al. (2012) have shown that the common method factor estimation approach is ineffective, but the behavioral sciences have no 
viable substitutes for this at the moment. In our case, as noted above, independent sources of data for the IVs and DVs is itself surely 
sufficient to counter the possibility of CMV, according to Podsakoff et al. (2003) and many others. 
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respondents, respondents from the first mailing, and respondents from the second mailing. Results of T-tests of 
these timed waves showed no differences among all four comparisons at an alpha protection level of 0.05 
(Armstrong and Overton 1977). Given the assumption that late respondents can be reasonable surrogates for non-
respondents, there appears to be no serious bias. We also conclude that respondents were at the appropriate 
management level and can therefore be expected to provide reasonably accurate answers.  
6. Analysis and Results 
CB-SEM via AMOS, the Analysis of Moment Structures program, version 20.0 (Arbuckle, 2011) was used to test 
the proposed model in Figure 1. CB-SEM was used because of the strength of prior theory, because of its ability 
to isolate measurement error in the measurement portion of the model as well as to test the theorized model, and 
because the relevant effects of interest can be tested simultaneously rather than through a series of regression 
equations (Gefen et al. 2011). As recommended by Gefen et al. (2000), a two-stage analytical process was 
employed for the data analysis. The measurement model was first assessed to determine how observed items 
load on the constructs in the model. Then, the assessment of the structural model allows for hypothesis testing by 
examining the relationships among the constructs. 
Before analyzing the AMOS model, assumptions of independent observations and univariate/multivariate 
normality should be examined (Arbuckle 2011; Gefen et al. 2011), as described in Online Supplement Appendix 
F. In addition, Table 2 shows the correlations between the summates of the research variables. The highest 
correlation exists between value capture and relational governance (0.542)6 while the remaining correlations 
among constructs ranged from -0.116 to 0.465. Multicollinearity between independent and moderating variables 
was assessed using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The results show that the values of VIF for variables are 
acceptable ranging from 1.126 to 2.3217 (Petter et al. 2007). These correlations plus the result from the VIF test 
suggest that multicollinearity is not a serious problem, particularly when the purpose of the analysis is to make 
inferences on the response function or the prediction of new observations (Neter et al. 1985).  
 
6 We did not consider the correlations between outsourcing performance and value capture and between outsourcing performance and 
value creation because outsourcing performance is the second-order factor consisting of value capture and value creation. 
7 We also checked the correlations among different first-order measures. The correlations ranged from -0.073 to 0.521. The highest 
correlation is 0.521 between 1st measure item of relational governance and 2nd measure item of value capture and the second highest is 
0.494 between 4th measure item of relational governance and 1st measure item of cognitive legitimacy. Among three legitimacy factors, the 
highest correlation is 0.433 between 2nd measure item of moral legitimacy and 2nd measure item of pragmatic legitimacy, while the second 
highest one is 0.426 between 2nd measure item of moral legitimacy and 1st measure item of pragmatic legitimacy. Multicollinearity was tested 
using the VIF. The values of VIF ranged from 2.247 to 3.492, which are acceptable by some methodological standards (Petter et al. 2007). 
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Table 2. Correlations between Constructs 
Construct Means (S.D.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Project Size  4.410 (1.431) 1.000  
            
2. Project  
Length 
5.380 
(2.547) -.053 1.000 
            





(6.976) -.116 .029 .035 1.000           
5. Vendor  
Reputation 
6.778 
(5.418) -.068 -.030 -.013 .066 1.000          
6. Relative  
Firm Size 
5.388 
(3.676) .075 .035 .047 .161* -.117 1.000         
7. Time span 3.430 (1.145) -.033 .031 .004 .051 .062 -.058 1.000        
8. Pragmatic  
Legitimacy 
4.537 
(1.237) .075 -.030 .003 .029 .023 -.016 -.028 1.000       
9. Moral  
Legitimacy 
4.567 
(1.104) -.003 -.004 .026 .070 -.053 .019 .007 .129 1.000      
10. Cognitive  
Legitimacy 
4.585 
















(1.303) .009 -.072 .021 .028 -.012 -.008 -.098 -.071 .215** .400** .034 .121 .159* 1.000 
 Note: Two categorical control variables (i.e., outsourcing project type and client industry type) are not included. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
The first step was to estimate the measurement model using AMOS 20.0. Overall, the resulting fit indices 
suggest an acceptable fit, as detailed in Online Supplement Appendix G. With an adequate measurement model 
and an acceptable level of multicollinearity, we next estimated the structural model, based on both the 
hypothesized relationships between the latent constructs and their associated observed variables (Gefen et al. 
2000). As summarized in Table 3(a), results show that the value of chi-square/df is 1.153, which is within the 
acceptable range between 1 and 5 (Ragu-Nathan et al. 2008) and the fit indices are satisfactory (GFI=0.914; 
AGFI=0.882; NFI=0.937; TLI=0.984; RMSEA=0.025; SRMR=0.056). Although the AGFI value is lower than 0.9, 
an AGFI higher than 0.8 is also deemed by many methodologists to be acceptable (Hadjistavropoulos et al. 1999; 
Ragu-Nathan et al. 2008). As shown in Table 3(b) and Figure 2, seven out of the nine hypotheses within the model 
were supported at the 0.05 alpha protection level. In addition, no control variables showed significant relationships 
with either three mediators or outsourcing performance, with one exception, the relationship between time span 
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and cognitive legitimacy.8 It is also critical to note that the proposed model accounted for a quite respectable 
29.6% of the variance in outsourcing performance.  
Figure 2 shows that the contractual governance had a significant effect on both the maintenance of vendor 
pragmatic legitimacy (β=0.166; t=2.189; p<0.05) and that of vendor moral legitimacy (β=0.206; t=2.368; p<0.05), 
supporting H1 and H2. However, the effect of the contractual governance on the maintenance of vendor cognitive 
legitimacy was insignificant, indicating that H3 was not supported.9  
As in Figure 2, relational governance had a significant effect on all three types of vendor legitimacy, namely, 
vendor pragmatic legitimacy (β=0.559; t=7.457; p<0.01), vendor moral legitimacy (β=0.387; t=4.961; p<0.01), and 
vendor cognitive legitimacy (β=0.275; t=3.586; p<0.01), providing support for H4, H5, and H6. 
We expected that outsourcing performance would be positively affected by three types of vendor legitimacy. 
The results showed that vendor pragmatic legitimacy (β=0.267; t=2.015; p<0.05) and vendor cognitive legitimacy 
(β=0.358; t=5.764; p<0.01) had positive significant effects on outsourcing performance while vendor moral 
legitimacy did not. H7and H9 were thus supported but H8 was not.10  
Table 3. Results of the Structural Model Analysis 
(a) Goodness of fit for the Structural Model 
Fit Indices χ2 df χ2 /df GFI AGFI NFI RMSEA SRMR IFI RFI TLI CFI 
Observed 
Value 246.75 214 1.153 0.914 0.882 0.937 0.025 0.056 0.994 0.925 0.984 0.989 
Desired 
Value - - < 3 > 0.9 > 0.9 > 0.9 < 0.08 < 0.08 > 0.9 > 0.9 >0.9 > 0.9 
(b) Causal Effects in the Structural Model 
Endogenous 
Variable Determinants 




H1 (Contractual Governance) 0.166** - 0.166** Supported 
H4 (Relational Governance) 0.559*** - 0.559*** Supported 
Project Type I (application development & maintenance) 
Project Type II (network management) 
Project Type III (IT consulting) 
Project Type IV (data center management) 

















Client Industry I (manufacturing) 
Client Industry II (banking & finance) 
Client Industry III (insurance & healthcare) 
Client Industry IV (utility & energy) 

















Project Size 0.004 - 0.004 - 
Project Length 0.030 - 0.030 - 
Prior Relation 0.013 - 0.013 - 
Vendor Established Year 0.049 - 0.049 - 
Vendor Reputation 0.017 - 0.017 - 
 
8 Campbell and Fiske (1959) point out that it is inevitable that in large matrices, such as in this case, there will be some spurious violations. 
One violation in a matrix this large is likely just by chance (Campbell and Fiske 1959).  
9 There is little possibility of a Type II error in that the statistical power was above .8.  
10 Again, statistical power was above .8. 
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Relative Firm Size 0.020 - 0.020 - 




H2 (Contractual Governance) 0.206** - 0.206** Supported 
H5 (Relational Governance) 0.387*** - 0.387*** Supported 
Project Type I (application development & maintenance) 
Project Type II (network management) 
Project Type III (IT consulting) 
Project Type IV (data center management) 

















Client Industry I (manufacturing) 
Client Industry II (banking & finance) 
Client Industry III (insurance & healthcare) 
Client Industry IV (utility & energy) 

















Project Size 0.016 - 0.016 - 
Project Length 0.020 - 0.020 - 
Prior Relation 0.034 - 0.034 - 
Vendor Established Year 0.007 - 0.007 - 
Vendor Reputation 0.045 - 0.045 - 
Relative Firm Size 0.016 - 0.016 - 




H3 (Contractual Governance) 0.119 - 0.119 Not Supported 
H6 (Relational Governance) 0.275*** - 0.275*** Supported 
Project Type I (application development & maintenance) 
Project Type II (network management) 
Project Type III (IT consulting) 
Project Type IV (data center management) 

















Client Industry I (manufacturing) 
Client Industry II (banking & finance) 
Client Industry III (insurance & healthcare) 
Client Industry IV (utility & energy) 

















Project Size 0.081 - 0.081 - 
Project Length 0.019 - 0.019 - 
Prior Relation 0.097 - 0.097 - 
Vendor Established Year 0.014 - 0.014 - 
Vendor Reputation 0.005 - 0.005 - 
Relative Firm Size -0.002 - -0.002 - 




H7 (Pragmatic Legitimacy) 0.267** - 0.267** Supported 
H8 (Moral Legitimacy) 0.098 - 0.098 Not Supported 
H9 (Cognitive Legitimacy) 0.358*** - 0.358*** Supported 
Contractual Governance - 0.089 0.089 - 
Relational Governance - 0.258 0.258 - 
Project Type I (application development & maintenance) 
Project Type II (network management) 
Project Type III (IT consulting) 
Project Type IV (data center management) 

















Client Industry I (manufacturing) 
Client Industry II (banking & finance) 
Client Industry III (insurance & healthcare) 
Client Industry IV (utility & energy) 

















Project Size 0.015 -  - 
Project Length 0.003 -  - 
Prior Relation -0.058 - -0.058 - 
Vendor Established Year 0.012 -  - 
Vendor Reputation -0.025 -  - 
Relative Firm Size -0.024 -  - 
Time Span -0.019 -  - 
. Note: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
It is interesting to note that relational governance was more important by far than formal contractual 
mechanisms in influencing legitimacy and subsequently outsourcing performance. Notably, the standardized path 
coefficient for relational governance is nearly three times as large as that of contractual governance on vendor 
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pragmatic legitimacy. Relational governance also has a stronger effect on vendor moral legitimacy than contractual 
governance. In addition, relational governance has a significant impact on vendor cognitive legitimacy whereas the 
effect of contractual governance on this variable is insignificant. Hence, in explaining outsourcing performance, 
vendor cognitive legitimacy is key. 
 
 
Note: Hypotheses in bold lines were supported; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Figure 2. Hypotheses Testing Results 
 
6.2. Endogeneity and Robustness Checks 
To account for potential endogeneity between two types of ITO governance strategy and three legitimacy factors, 
we adopted three different approaches. First, we followed the Durbin-Wu-Hausman method to check whether the 
endogeneity exists in our research context (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993; Dong et al. 2017). In this process, we 
applied the instrumental variable (IV) technique by introducing two IVs (i.e., internal IT governance types including 
hierarchy governance and network governance). With the two IVs, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman analysis was carried 
out for both self-reported performance data (i.e., outsourcing performance) and relatively objective archival 
performance data (i.e., total sales as of 2013). The results show that both ITO governance strategies (contractual 
governance and relational governance) were exogenous in our setting, as described in the H.1 section of Online 
Supplement Appendix H. Second, we ran endogeneity tests using the estat endogenous procedure and the two-
step GMM procedure (Baum et al. 2003; Dong et al. 2017) in STATA with the two IVs to confirm whether 
endogeneity is a serious concern. Both analyses show consistent results, indicating that contractual governance 
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and relational governance are exogenous in our research model, as explained in the H.2 section of Online 
Supplement Appendix H.  
In addition, we carried out two further, different analyses to handle endogeneity arising from the possible 
reverse causality between vendor legitimacy and outsourcing performance. One approach involves formulating a 
regression equation for each of two possible causal pathways (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1999; Spearing et al. 2012; 
Wooldridge 2009). In particular, Spearing et al. (2012, p. 1221) suggested this as a good way to test the existence 
of reverse causality. For example, we can estimate two equations [e.g., (1) outsourcing performance (DV) = 
pragmatic legitimacy (IV) and (2) pragmatic legitimacy (DV) = outsourcing performance (IV)] simultaneously, and 
then observe whether or not there is statistically significant correlation between the error terms of the two equations. 
The other approach is to conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman analysis focusing on the relationship between three 
legitimacy factors and outsourcing performance (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993; Dong et al. 2017). Findings from 
both tests indicate that there is no reverse causality between three vendor legitimacy factors and outsourcing 
performance, as shown in the H.3 section of Online Supplement Appendix H. 
To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the model in five different ways. The results of four 
different robustness tests were then compared with the results from our original model. First, we reexamined our 
model with relatively objective data instead of outsourcing performance. We computed a three-year average from 
2014 to 2016 of ROA as a surrogate for outsourcing value capture and Tobin’s q as a surrogate for outsourcing 
value creation and reran the structural model in AMOS. The results using these financial data were very similar to 
that of our original self-report data analysis, as shown in the I.1 section of Online Supplement Appendix I.  
Second, we randomly chose 100 out of 185 total sample and then reran the model using AMOS (Fafchamps 
and Labonne 2017). The results are similar to our original analysis although there is a small difference in terms of 
coefficients and R-square, as explained in the I.2 section of Online Supplement Appendix I. 
Third, we used the vce (robust) regression option in STATA for adjusting heterogeneity in OLS (Stata 2013). 
With assumptions that there are heterogeneity and autocorrelation in the OLS estimations and error terms, this 
STATA option adjusts for heterogeneity in OLS. Thus, after conducting the vce option in STATA, we compared the 
results between the original OLS and the adjusted OLS. As summarized in the I.3 section of Online Supplement 
Appendix I, there seem to be no serious heterogeneity and autocorrelation.  
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Fourth, we checked on whether or not our model is superior to competing models. The mediation model 
proposed in Figure 1 can be tested against a direct model that links the two types of outsourcing governance 
directly to outsourcing performance. This model is pitted against a mediation model where vendor pragmatic 
legitimacy, vendor moral legitimacy, and vendor cognitive legitimacy play mediating roles in the relationships 
between the two types of governance and outsourcing performance. To test whether the mediation model proposed 
here is better than a direct model, we carried out an additional analysis, as detailed in Online Supplement Appendix 
J. The results show that our mediation model is superior. Another competing model is a moderation model where 
three legitimacy factors moderate direct causal links between the governance strategies and outsourcing 
performance. We examine this as well as conducting another test on the direct model and present these results in 
Online Supplement Appendix K. Neither competing model performs better than our full mediation model.  
Finally, we checked on the possibility of co-determination of both contractual governance and relational 
governance (although the two governance types are supposed to be conceptually independent). In other words, 
organizations may not typically embrace either a pure contractual governance strategy or a relational governance 
strategy. Different from prior studies focused on analyzing the complementary or substitute effect between certain 
contractual governance factors (e.g., contract complexity and contract flexibility) and relational governance factors 
(e.g., information exchange and harmonious conflict resolution) as in Poppo and Zenger (2002), Goo et al. (2009), 
and Rai et al. (2012), our approach was to place our sole attention on vendor legitimacy and to analyze how 
contractual governance or relational governance function, in general, in managing outsourcing relationships with 
vendors. Results indicate that the interaction effects between contractual governance and relational governance 
were not positively significant, as summarized in Online Supplement Appendix L. All in all, based on the results of 
various endogeneity and robustness checks, we conclude that endogeneity is not a serious concern and the overall 
consistency of results across different approaches are robust.  
7. Discussion and Contributions  
Vendor legitimacy has become increasingly pertinent in today’s ITO relationships. Drawing upon the theoretical 
literatures on organizational legitimacy and ITO, a set of hypotheses for understanding the nature and the impacts 
of vendor legitimacy as well as governance strategies in managing legitimacy were posited. Empirical results 
support all but two hypotheses, providing evidence for the core of our theoretical arguments. In this section, the 
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theoretical implications of the findings are discussed along with explanations for the unsupported hypothesis. 
Finally, we present recommendations for managerial practice and future academic research.   
This research contributes to the IS literature in several ways (Table 4). First, the study extends the ITO 
literature by identifying, incorporating and developing a legitimacy perspective, complementing the existing 
dominant theoretical foundations of the research on ITO. Specifically, while prior research has noted the role of 
legitimacy in the adoption of ITO as an innovative way of organizing, the present study deconstructs how legitimacy 
influences outcomes in specific ITO relationships, especially the role of the client’s perceived legitimacy of the 
vendors, a notion that has become particularly relevant in the prevailing turbulent technological, business, and 
social environments. Vendor legitimacy is conceptualized via three components, namely, pragmatic, moral, and 
cognitive legitimacy. Empirical findings suggest that while vendor legitimacy contributes overall to ITO performance, 
these three types of legitimacy demonstrate varying levels of influence. Vendor cognitive legitimacy, reflecting the 
client’s perception of the vendor as a taken-for-granted, integral partner to the client’s activities, has a particularly 
high impact on outsourcing performance. Moral legitimacy, on the other hand, appears to have little-to-no effect.  
Table 4. Summary of Implications and Contributions 
Prior IT Outsourcing Literature This Study’s Approach Contributions 
Considers primarily the role of 
external legitimacy in 
organizations’ adoption of 
outsourcing as a model for 
organizing. Vendor legitimacy as a 
salient force in today’s changing IT 
outsourcing landscape is 
understudied.  
Introduces internal, vendor 
legitimacy and depicts and 
analyzes its impact on IT 
outsourcing performance. 
- Extends the conceptualization and application of 
organizational legitimacy to the context of IT 
outsourcing. 
 
- Advances the institutional perspective by offering a 
legitimacy lens for further exploring performance 
outcomes in IT outsourcing. 
Identifies contractual governance 
and relational governance as two 
key strategies for managing 
vendors. Prior research had not 
linked these governance strategies 
to legitimacy management. 
Investigates the impact of the 
two types of governance 
strategies on the three types of 
vendor legitimacy  
- Enriches the legitimacy management literature by 
theorizing and empirically validating the important 
roles of contractual and relational governance 
strategies.  
 
- Highlights the managerial imperative of fostering 
communication and bonding between clients and 
vendors. 
Extensively examines the direct 
link between clients’ governance 
strategies and outsourcing 
performance  
Analyzes the mediating effect 
of vendor legitimacy on the 
relationship between 
governance and outsourcing 
performance.  
- Responds to the calls for theorizing and empirical 
investigation of client-vendor relationship and 
performance in IT outsourcing.  
 
- Provides a nuanced conceptualization of the 
mechanisms by which governance strategies 
shape outsourcing performance. 
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Why was there a nonsignificant relationship between vendor moral legitimacy and performance, however? 
Vendor moral legitimacy involves a commitment to ethical practices, corporate social responsibility and 
sustainability-related initiatives, which may only bring economic value to the outsourcing relationship in the long 
term (Babin et al. 2011; Wang and Bansal 2012). If this is true, then, the time frame of the current study may not 
be long enough to capture the future impact of vendor legitimacy. Similarly, the perceived risk of IP loss, associated 
with lower vendor moral legitimacy, tends to damage performance in the long term but not necessarily in the near 
term (Pisano and Shih 2009; Rossetti and Choi 2005).  
The current study advances the specific stream of research on ITO governance in a second way by unpacking 
the effects of governance strategies in shaping vendor legitimacy. The results demonstrate the overall positive 
impact of contractual and relational governance on the three types of vendor legitimacy. Meanwhile, while both 
types of governance improve pragmatic and moral legitimacy, relational governance, rather than contractual 
governance, plays a much more significant role in increasing vendor cognitive legitimacy. This finding both 
contrasts with and complements existing research on how to identify, assess, and manage legitimate vendors in 
changing environments (Fogarty and Bell 2014). Recent insights tend to emphasize a dynamic yet transient 
approach that relies on formal, contractual governance through measures such as establishing efficient 
organizational processes for engaging and employing diverse vendors, creating sufficient incentives, and 
developing IT platforms for integrating the products and services delivered by a portfolio of vendors (Su et al. 2016) 
whereas informal, relational governance are not as prominent in these emerging strategies. Contrariwise, the 
present study highlights the strategic value of relational governance even in the contemporary, increasingly agile 
form of outsourcing that represents a widely-adopted response to an uncertain business environment.  
 Finally, our theoretical model and its empirical findings, which were developed to substantiate the two 
aforementioned contributions, also point s to an opportunity to advance the ITO literature by revealing a plausible 
mechanism through which governance affects outsourcing performance. The existing literature on outsourcing, 
summarized by Cao and Lumineau’s meta-analysis (2015) of 143 articles on linking interorganizational governance 
(specifically, contractual and relational governance) to performance, discovers a consistent direct effect of 
relational governance on performance but mixed effects of contractual governance on performance (see also Gulati 
1995; Klein 1996). In keeping with literature that studies the direct performance impact of governance strategies, 
we tested post-hoc a model that links the two types of outsourcing governance directly to outsourcing performance, 
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as shown in Appendix J. Results reveal that the effect of relational governance on performance is significant while 
the effect of contractual governance on performance is insignificant, generally consistent with the literature. 
However, this otherwise significant direct effect of relationship governance on outsourcing performance becomes 
insignificant when we incorporate vendor legitimacy as a mediator and then test all relationships between the two 
governance types and the three legitimacy factors, between the three legitimacy factors and outsourcing 
performance, between the two governance types and outsourcing performance, one at a time. In fact, our analysis 
suggests that the three types of vendor legitimacy fully mediate the linkages between governance and outsourcing 
performance (see the full post-hoc mediation analysis in Appendix I). 
This mediation analysis hints that the reason why prior literature finds a direct effect of governance, 
particularly relational governance, on ITO performance but our study does not is because prior literature does not 
account for the legitimacy perspective. Following this line of thought, it is possible that prior thinking about the 
relationship between governance and outsourcing performance is incomplete unless it accounts for vendor 
legitimacy as an important underlying mechanism. Indeed, research that examines the impact of mechanisms of 
governance on performance in other IS contexts has come to the conclusion that governance mechanisms alone 
may not immediately influence performance outcomes because they are procedures that do not have a proximal, 
productive, or actionable element to them. For instance, Wu et al.’s (2015) study of ITO strategies finds that the 
impact of IT governance on firm performance is not direct, but fully mediated by strategic alignment between 
business and IT. Inspired by this insight and informed by the interesting results in the post-hoc analysis, our study 
suggests a more nuanced vendor legitimacy-based depiction of the mechanisms by which governance shapes 
performance in the ITO context.  
Performing a sophisticated substitution/complementary analysis that would add considerable value to this 
requires a highly granular approach to study each specific governance component.11 This might explain why our 
results show that the interaction effects between contractual governance and relational governance in the 
mediation model tested just above are not positively significant nor in the model only including the direct effects of 
 
11 When theorizing the substitutive and complementary relationship between contract and relational governance, Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) focus on the role of “contract customization” and “contractual complexity” as they interacted with relational governance when they 
state: “[T]he critical test of the relationship, as complements or substitutes between relational governance and contractual complexity, 
hinges on the sign and significance of coefficients for relational governance and contractual complexity” (p.719). Rai et al. (2012) found 
support for certain relational factors serving as substitutes for specific contractual governance factors. They further suggest that work 
aiming to reconcile the inconsistent findings on the substitutive and complementary relationship between these two governance strategies 
should adopt “a granular approach” to study the interaction among specific elements of contractual and relational governance.   
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Governance → Performance, as shown in Online Supplement Appendix L. We believe that future research could 
investigate how particular components of contractual (e.g., contract complexity and goal expectation) and relational 
(e.g., information exchange and conflict resolution) governance could serve as substitutes or complements in 
determining vendor legitimacy. 
Collectively, these findings highlight the pivotal role of legitimacy within client-vendor relationships as a 
powerful mechanism for achieving and sustaining ITO success. Putting it all together, future research could take 
our findings into account when further investigating the mechanisms through which governance strategies affect 
outsourcing performance, a long-standing topic of interest in ITO research.  
From the perspective of practitioners, our findings present an imperative to actively manage legitimacy in ITO. 
Overall, they argue that outsourcing managers should become sensitized to the multifaceted nature of client-
vendor relationships. Based on the typology of vendor legitimacy advanced in this study, organizations need to 
adapt and vary their governance strategies and related managerial practices to facilitate and leverage client-vendor 
interactions and achieve success. Specifically, organizations should first foster and maintain the awareness among 
outsourcing managers of the different types of vendor legitimacy. Managerial perception of vendors as 
strategically-aligned, long-term oriented, tightly-integrated partners, in particular, is critical (Bianchi and Johnson 
2016). At the operational level, the client should collaborate with vendors to design and establish routines to 
undergird the client managers’ perception of a high level of vendor legitimacy (Jogani et al. 2017), especially 
cognitive legitimacy. 
Second, the study prescribes and highlights specific measures for ITO governance. Recent practitioner 
insights have emphasized crafting well-designed contracts and incentives and creating robust digital infrastructures 
and platforms to facilitate collaboration with an increasingly diversified and dynamic portfolio of vendors (Drentin 
et al. 2018). Our study suggests further that relational governance can play a critical role for attaining procedural 
justice, ethical standards, and fairness in the interorganizational collaboration.  
Finally, the above implications suggest that creating a dedicated corporate function or organizational structure 
(Dyer et al. 2001) for continually assessing and overseeing a portfolio of vendors and swiftly monitoring and 
responding to potential issues and crises related to vendor legitimacy might be a worthwhile investment. Client 
organizational capability to evaluate, establish, and enhance different types of vendor legitimacy can contribute to 
their organizational transformation toward a more agile model of ITO (Himmelreich et al. 2019). 
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8. Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusion 
There are, of course, scholarly limitations, some of which suggest directions for future research. First, this study is 
a snapshot that does not capture the changing nature of outsourcing relationships. Ideally, longitudinal studies that 
track the evolution of outsourcing relationships are needed. Such research could provide a deeper understanding 
of the dynamic features of the outsourcing relationship and their influence on outsourcing success over time. 
Second, this study collected data only from client organizations. Although the client is commonly considered to be 
primary actor and the key informant who evaluates and enacts governance strategies of governance strategies in 
the ITO literature (Goo et al. 2009; Rai et al. 2012), the inclusion of data from the vendor side could allow a more 
nuanced and comprehensive examination of client-vendor relationships. Further research from the vendor’s 
perspective would yield additional insights into the connections between governance strategies, vendor legitimacy 
and outsourcing performance, as in Koh et al.’s qualitative study (2004).  
Third, there are limitations associated with the cultural factors embedded in the empirical national context 
here, i.e., South Korea. Obtaining data from a single national setting may limit the general applicability of our 
conclusions. Future research should extend work across different cultural settings to enhance generalizability and 
external validity. The fourth limitation is that there were no previously-developed questionnaire items for vendor 
legitimacy; thus, new measures were created based on the definition of constructs from relevant research. 
However, several measure items had to be removed after the pre-test and pilot tests, which might have resulted 
in slightly lower alignment between the original definitions of vendor legitimacy and their measures. Further 
research can improve on our work by adding to and refining measures of vendor legitimacy. Future studies can 
also create brand new measures, an approach that potentially increases the robustness of findings and 
nomological validity (Straub et al. 2004).   
Another limitation of this study is related to the focus on behavioral attributes in relational governance without 
including other psychological characteristics such as trust and commitment in our model. Results of our study could 
be more comprehensive and robust if trust measures were to be included and/or controlled in the model (Clarke 
2009). However, the rationale for the omission of trust measure was on the basis of our theorization on the sharp 
distinction between legitimacy and trust as well as of the focus on strategic actions in managing vendor legitimacy. 
That being argued, we do recommend that future studies incorporate trust into their models for further testing the 
relationship between trust and legitimacy.  
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Study findings also suggest several other directions for future research. First, future studies can explore the 
antecedents or determinants of vendor legitimacy across different characteristics of organization. For instance, 
contextual factors such as the organizational or national cultures of the client and vendor could shape different 
types of legitimacy. Second, another research direction would be to investigate how particular components of 
contractual governance (such as contract complexity or goal expectations) and relational governance (such as 
information exchange or conflict resolution) serve as substitutes or complements in shaping vendor legitimacy. As 
noted above and given our targeted research objective, we did not take this more granular approach (as suggested 
by Rai et al. 2012) to study each specific component in these two governance strategies. Building on our work and 
prior research, future studies can examine more detailed and nuanced interaction effects, including complementary 
and substitute effects, of different specific components of governance strategies on vendor legitimacy in particular 
and interorganizational exchanges in general.  
Third, future research can examine the variation in legitimacy within a single organization. Diverse 
stakeholders within the client, such as managers holding different positions in the organizational hierarchy might 
vary in the perception of vendor legitimacy; future research can compare perceptions across different roles and 
investigate the interplay of legitimacy and intraorganizational dynamics. Finally, future research can take a process 
perspective to disentangle the emergence and evolution of the different types of legitimacy, their interactions with 
the intraorganizational and interorganizational practices within and between the client and the vendor, and the 
impacts of legitimacy on outsourcing performance over different time frames. There are many meaningful questions 
that remain to be explored in the area of legitimacy in ITO. 
In conclusion, the notion of vendor legitimacy in ITO relationships represents an understudied but increasingly 
important area of inquiry in information systems. This study reveals how different types of vendor legitimacy exert 
differential effects on outsourcing performance and how contractual governance and relational governance play 
differential roles in managing legitimacy. 
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